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THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LAWYER'S DUTY TO 
BREACH CONFIDENTIALITY 
by JAMES E. MOLITERNO* 
The lawyer's duty of confidentiality springs from the lawyer-client 
relationship and its parameters are determined by the nature of that relationship. 
The federal government lawyer's client is like no other. The uniqueness of 
representing the United States calls for a unique approach to the duty of 
confidentiality. Unlike the private individual client, the government as a client 
does not speak with a single, unmistakable voice. Unlike the private entity client, 
the federal government has a paramount interest in the public good, including the 
public's right to know about government (the entity's conduct), especially its 
misconduct. The result is a client in whose interest it is for confidentiality to be 
waived in instances of client misconduct, giving rise to the federal government 
lawyer's duty to breach confidentiality. 
I. THE UNITED STATES AS A CLIENT 
Government lawyers certainly have some duty of confidentiality to their 
client, but their lawyer-client relationship is in many ways strikingly different from 
that of a private lawyer and client relationship. The government lawyer's duty is 
much more modest in scope and perhaps even different in kind. The client of the 
government lawyer is vastly different from the private lawyer's privately interested 
client who generally holds no special public-abiding interests and duties. Just who 
the government lawyer's client is has been subject to widely different claims. 
Roger Cramton has usefully articulated the spectrum of possibilities, ranging from 
the people and the public interest, or the United States as a whole, or the branch of 
government within which the lawyer works, and even the specific agency for whom 
the lawyer works. 1 Some have argued that the specific identity of the government 
lawyer's client does not matter so much as an understanding of the lawyer's 
particular role.2 Whatever may be the precise answer, if indeed the answer matters, 
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of Law. Thanks to Erin Green for excellent research assistance and to the William & Mary Graduate 
Research Fellows program for continued provision of research assistance. William & Mary Librarians 
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1. Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer As Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the Government Lawyer, 
5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 296 (1991) [hereinafter, Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower]. 
2. Robert P. Lawry, Who Is the Client of the Federal Government LaVvyer: An Analysis of the 
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It IS clear that the government lawyer represents a public-abiding client whose 
genuine interests will not be served by the same level of secrecy to which private 
clients may be entitled, no matter how much particular agents of the government 
may wish to have that higher level of secrecy. 
Confidentiality proceeds from a well-known starting point: we balance the 
moral force pressing for revelation against our lawyer role and its force toward 
non-disclosure or active concealment. In the easy cases, in the everyday work of 
lawyers, when little moral force demands revelation, this balance is easy to strike. 
But when some stronger moral force arises, when revelation would help remedy a 
wrong, prevent a wrong, or prevent further harm from a past wrong, the moral force 
toward revelation increases, and the balance gives us pause. The bar rules provide 
an institutional expression of the profession's balance point for us as lawyers, 
dictating when future wrongs or harms may be revealed, prohibiting revelation of 
past wrongs in most instances, and providing for other exceptions to the general 
duty to maintain client confidences. 3 
When a court or other government power such as a grand jury gets involved, 
we speak of this same balancing process by invoking the attorney-client privilege. 
The balancing work is largely the same. Now, however, the court's need for the 
information adds to the moral force toward revelation and inserts into the equation 
an entity with the power to command revelation. The privilege, to be sure, has 
different parameters from the general duty of confidentiality, but the process of 
balancing is largely the same. Even the different scope of the duty and the 
privilege produce the same results once a court is involved. For example, although 
the future crime-fraud exception to the ethical duty may be narrower than the 
crime-fraud exception to the privilege, the difference hardly matters once a court is 
involved. The court works with the broader exception relevant to the claim of 
privilege. When it is met and disclosure is commanded, the duty and its narrower 
exception yield based on the exception to the duty of confidentiality for court 
orders. 
In the case of a government lawyer, the moral force toward revelation has an 
element not present for the private lawyer: the government lawyer works for a 
public-abiding client, one that would expect disclosure of internal government 
wrongdoing. The government has expressed this desire in statutes like 28 U.S.C. 
section 535(b)4 and the Federal Whistle Blower Statute.5 The former commands 
revelation of criminal wrongdoing and the latter encourages and protects revelation 
of a wide range of criminal and non-criminal government wrongdoing. 
The lawyer-role force for protecting confidences in the first instance is about 
Wrong Question, 37 FED. B. AsS'N J. 61,62 (1978). 
/d. 
3. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003). 
4. 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (2002). Section 535(b) requires that: 
[a]ny information, allegation, matter, or complaint witnessed, discovered, or received in a 
department or agency of the executive branch of the Government relating to violations of 
Federal criminal law involving Government officers and employees [to] be expeditiously 
reported to the Attorney General by the head of the department or agency, or the witness, 
discoverer, or recipient, as appropriate. 
5. See infra section II. 
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protecting the client. Having a client that wants revelation of certain information 
alters the confidentiality balance dramatically. The force favoring non-disclosure is 
reduced to nothing with respect to information covered by revelation statutes and 
the force toward revelation is increased by the public-abiding nature of the 
government. This difference in moral force toward revelation applies with or 
without a court's involvement. It exists in the day-to-day work of the government 
lawyer, in the nature of the government lawyer's client and in the revelation 
statutes. 
To be sure, in some instances the force toward non-disclosure remains high 
even for the government lawyer: dealing with properly classified material; matters 
of criminal investigation that would be compromised by revelation; safety interests 
of clandestine government employees; and those instances in which the 
government lawyer plays a role analogous to a private lawyer. But when 
wrongdoing is implicated by the information, the government lawyer's duty of 
confidentiality yields to the moral force pressing for revelation. 
At times, a government lawyer's duty of confidentiality and the associated 
attorney-client privilege approximate that of private counsel, but in most respects, 
federal lawyers do not have the same ethic of client protection as do private 
lawyers. Communications involving properly classified military, diplomatic, or 
national security issues should be subject to protections equal to those that private 
lawyers owe their clients. Certain aspects of Freedom of Information Act litigation 
incorporate ordinary attorney-client privilege principles.6 Information about 
ongoing criminal investigations requires protection when its premature release 
would disrupt legitimate law enforcement activities. When government lawyers 
represent agency personnel as if they were private counsel, private attorney-client 
privilege and duties apply_? And in litigation, while special rules command 
6. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("We have recognized that 'Exemption 5 
protects, as a general rule, materials which would be protected under the attorney-client privilege.'" 
(quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980))). See also 5 
U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2002) (clarifying when governmental agencies' obligation to make information 
available to the public applies); Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that 
"[t]he attorney client privilege protects confidential communications from clients to their attorneys made 
for the purpose of securing legal advice or services," and that "[i]n the government context, the 'client' 
may be the agency and the attorney may be an agency lawyer"); Brinton v. Dep't of State, 636 F.2d 600, 
603-04 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that "when the attorney communicates to the client, the [attorney-client] 
privilege applies only if the communication 'is based on confidential information provided by the 
client,"' and that "[t]his limitation applies generally to attorney-client privilege cases whether or not in 
the context of the FOIA"). 
7. Theodore B. Olsen, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Confidentiality of the 
Attorney General's Communications in Counseling the President, 6 OP. OFF. LEGAL CoUNSEL 481,495 
(1982); Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Disclosure of Confidential 
Information Received by U.S. Attorney in the Course of Representing a Federal Employee (Nov. 30, 
1976); Ralph W. Tarr, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Duty of Government 
Lawyer Upon Receipt of Incriminating Information in the Course of an Attorney-Client Relationship 
with Another Government Employee (Mar. 29, 1985). See also 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a)(3) (1998) (stating 
that "[a]ttorneys employed by ... the Department of Justice who participate in any process utilized for 
the purpose of determining whether the Department should provide representation to a federal employee, 
undertake a full and traditional attorney-client relationship with the employee with respect to application 
of the attorney-client privilege," and "[i]frepresentation is authorized, Justice Department attorneys who 
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disclosures from government lawyers, disclosure of favorable information may be 
delayed to the same extent as for a private lawyer in gaining appropriate litigation 
strategy advantages. Ordinary advantages in the litigation and regulation processes 
allow the government's lawyers to behave as adversaries legitimately do. But 
government lawyers are not to remain quiet when their client has information that 
will aid a criminal defendant,8 nor when the government has behaved wrongfully. 
Especially when agency wrongdoing is implicated, the government lawyer's duty 
of confidentiality and ability to resist official demands for information are far more 
restricted than that of a private lawyer: "The government lawyer has a 
responsibility to question the conduct of agency officials more extensively than a 
lawyer for a private organization would in similar circumstances."9 The 
government is not like a private client who has a right to expect her lawyer to 
maintain confidence about past wrongdoing. 10 The government, by contrast, owes 
revelation of its own wrongdoing to the public. The government itself, its mission 
properly conceived, ought to want such information revealed. The government has 
expressed this preference by enacting statutes that either command or encourage 
revelation of government wrongdoing. 11 
Federal employees have a statutory obligation to report criminal wrongdoing 
by other employees to the Attorney General. 12 The statute applies to lawyers as 
well as other employees.13 A private lawyer has no such obligation. 14 Even under 
the Enron-inspired August 2003 amendment to Model Rule 1.6, unless the lawyer's 
services were used to commit the past criminal act of a client, the lawyer may not 
disclose. Even then, the disclosure is permissive rather than mandatory. 15 No rule 
requires a private lawyer to report criminal conduct of non-lawyer third parties. 16 
For federal lawyers, however, the statute requires disclosure of certain client acts, 
even past acts with which the lawyer has had no involvement, much less those that 
have used or misused the lawyer's services. 17 "[T]he general duty of public service 
calls upon government employees and agencies to favor disclosure over 
concealment." 18 The statute, along with the Federal Whistle Blower Protection Act, 
is a positive indication of the reduced confidentiality that federal lawyers owe their 
client. The statute advances a salutary purpose, one desired by the government that 
enacted it: "[To] require the reporting by the departments and agencies of the 
executive branch to the Attorney General of information corning to their attention 
represent an employee under this section also undertake a full and traditional attorney-client relationship 
with the employee with respect to the attorney-client privilege"). 
8. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
9. FED. BAR ASS'N RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCf R. 1.13 cmt. (1990). 
10. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 924 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 521 
U.S. 1105 (1997). 
11. 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (2002). 
12. ld. 
13. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1274. 
14. Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920. 
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCf R. 1.6 (2003). 
16. The duty to report unprivileged information about the serious misconduct of a fellow lawyer 
stands in contrast to this general principle. !d. R. 8.3. 
17. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1274; Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F. 3d at 920-21. 
18. Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920. 
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concerning any alleged irregularities on the part of officers and employees of the 
Government."19 
Well before the enactment of the Federal Whistle Blower Statute,20 official 
guidance provided to government lawyers followed a whistle blower theme. 
Federal Bar Association Opinion 73-1 instructed the government lawyer that her 
clients are the agency and the public interest.21 Further, the confidentiality owed to 
the agency yielded when an official ceased to act in the public interest. 22 The 
Opinion authorized a federal lawyer to disclose agency misconduct outside the 
agency as long as the agency is given a first opportunity to correct its own errors. 
"[T]he lawyer himself is to determine whether the [internal] remedial measures 
taken are sufficient."23 
The public interest is difficult to identify, of course, and each government 
lawyer cannot be charged with the responsibility of acting purely on her sense of it. 
Chaos would ensue within agencies if each lawyer could apply her own unfettered 
vision of the public interest. Rather, the government lawyer functions in a direct 
line from some legitimate articulator of the public interest.24 But disclosing 
wrongful conduct is not reflective of a mere public interest dispute about the better 
course for government action to take. That judgment, that a colleague's or 
superior's conduct is wrongful or criminal, is the individual lawyer's judgment to 
make.25 The individual's judgment is not final, of course, but it is determinative for 
purposes of defining the lawyer's proper conduct when faced with acting on the 
wrongful conduct. That is what is expected by 28 section 535(b) and the Federal 
Whistle Blower Statute, through the general reduction in confidentiality owed. 
And if the lawyer engages in conduct that is considered participation in the 
wrongdoing, it is expected by the law governing the lawyer's own liability for the 
19. H.R. Rep. No. 83-2622, 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3551, 3551 (1954). 
20. Discussed infra, section liB. 
21. Fed. B. Ass'n, Op. 73-1, 32 FED. B. 1. 71 (1973). 
22. Lawry, supra note 2, at 64. See also, ABA, The Survey of the Legal Profession, quoted in 
Murray Seasongood, Public Service by Lawyers in Local Government, 2 SYRACUSE L. REv. 210, 222 
(1951) ("To Inspire Confidence, ... Public Legal Positions Shall be Conducted and Opinions Rendered 
According to Law and Not to Please Politicians."). 
23. Lawry, supra note 2, at 65. 
24. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 1293, 1294-95 (1987) (stating that although government attorneys represent the public 
interest, "[n]othing systemic empowers [them] to substitute their individual conceptions of the good for 
the priorities and objectives established through . . . governmental process"); Steven K. Berenson, 
Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 
41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 846 (2000). Berenson states that: 
/d. 
execution of the pubic interest serving role for government attorneys is not the equivalent of 
attorneys following their individual policy preferences .... Rather, application of the 
standard techniques of legal analysis and merit, bureaucratic accountability, and democratic 
governance ... can provide adequate constraints against lawyers running amok in pursuit of 
their personal policy preferences. 
25. See, e.g., William Josephson and Russell Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer Owe 
the Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are in Conflict?, 29 How. L.J. 539, 556 (1986) (stating that "[t]he 
government lawyer ... must determine whether the public official is acting in accord with the law and 
only obey or represent officials who are"). 
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misconduct. 
Consider the unusual confluence of cases that surrounded Vince Foster's death 
and the information sought regarding Foster's knowledge of White House 
activities. Vincent Foster was Bill Clinton's White House Counsel. Before his 
tragic death, he had met with private counsel, likely about matters occurring in the 
White House. After his death, a meeting occurred among Hillary Clinton, White 
House lawyers, and her private lawyers.26 The Office of Independent Counsel 
(OIC) wanted to know about Mr. Foster's knowledge of various activities of the 
Clintons.27 An OIC-led grand jury issued subpoenas to Foster's private lawyers, 
demanding their notes of meetings with Mr. Foster.29 They also issued subpoenas 
to the White House and its lawyers, demanding notes of White House 
conversations regarding Mrs. Clinton's activities following Mr. Foster's death.30 In 
a stark juxtaposition that illustrated the contrasting extent of the attorney-client 
privilege for private and public lawyers, the Supreme Court protected Foster's 
private counsel's notes31 as the Eighth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit ordered 
revelation of the White House lawyers' notes of meetings likely regarding 
substantially the same subject matter.32 
Writing in praise of government lawyers, Roger Cramton suggested that the 
Attorney General ought to be an independent advisor to the President, willing to 
demand that the President comply with legal authority and execute the laws without 
favor, and if the President refuses, "resign and publicly explain the circumstances 
that led to his resignation .... "33 In a variety of critical moments, government 
lawyers have behaved just this way or affected events by announcing their 
intentions to do so. When then Solicitor General Robert Bork was asked to join 
President Nixon's legal defense team, he captured the difference: "A government 
attorney is sworn to uphold the Constitution. If I come across evidence that is bad 
for the President, I'll have to tum it over. I won't be able to sit on it like a private 
defense attomey."34 Acting on this difference, Peter Wallison, White House 
Counsel under President Reagan, produced his diary for the Iran-Contra 
investigation. 35 
The obligation of a government lawyer to uphold the public trust reposed in 
her strongly militates against allowing the client agency to invoke a privilege to 
prevent the lawyer from providing evidence of the possible commission of criminal 
offenses within the government. As Judge Weinstein put it, "if there is wrongdoing 
in government, it must be exposed .... [The government lawyer's] duty to the 
26. Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 914. 
27. See id. (stating that OIC sought disclosure of Foster's notes). 
29. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 399 (1998). 
30. Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 924. 
31. Swindler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 411. 
32. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1278; Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 924. 
33. Roger C. Cramton, On the Courage and Steadfastness of Government Lawyers, 23 J. 
MARSHALL L. REv. 165, 173-174 (1990) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Cramton, On the Courage]. 
34. A Conversation with Raben Bark, D.C. BAR REP., Dec. 1997-Jan. 1998, at 9. 
35. Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Repon of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters 44,470 
n.137, 517,520 (1993). 
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people, the law, and his own conscience requires disclosure .... "36 
Other government lawyers have been bitten by the justifiably less generous 
attorney-client privilege possessed by the government. Richard Kleindienst was 
working on the ITT antitrust matter when President Nixon called to insist he 
terminate the appealY Cooler heads prevailed, and Nixon withdrew his 
instruction. 38 When later asked at Senate hearings whether he had spoken to 
anyone at the White House regarding the ITT case, Kleindienst said, "no," mentally 
applying an unreasonably narrow interpretation of the question to include only 
White House staff but not the President. He was later charged with a felony and 
pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor for failing to fully answer committee questions.39 
A private lawyer might have successfully invoked the attorney-client privilege 
regarding that conversation with his client, but a government lawyer? Surely not.40 
Government lawyers have not always functioned as they should. Many 
government lawyers remained quiet in the face of government fraud and 
wrongdoing (and some actively dissembled) during litigation of the Hirabayashi41 
and Korematsu cases.42 They should not have. John J. McCloy, Assistant 
Secretary of War, and Assistant Attorney General Herbert Wechsler, in particular, 
knowingly allowed the Supreme Court to be misled regarding the record in the 
case.43 Wechsler's client was the government. The government is not entitled to a 
lawyer who will conceal material facts or even fail to reveal that his client has done 
so. Courts expect that when dealing with a government lawyer, they get a more 
candid picture of the facts and the legal principles governing the case.44 In doing 
so, the government lawyer is doing nothing more or less than following the wishes 
of her client. 
36. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1273 (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Some Ethical and Political Problems of a 
Government Attorney, 18 ME. L. REv. 155, 160 (1966)). 
37. Cramton, On the Courage, supra note 33, at 169. 
38. ld. 
39. ld. at 171. 
40. See Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920-22 (explaining the different treatment of 
government and private counsel for attorney-client privilege treatment). "No one, the White House 
argues, would suppose that the special prosecutor could compel the production of notes made by a 
private lawyer concerning a conversation with a client about even the most routine traffic ticket." ld. at 
919; cf Swidler, 524 U.S. at 401 (holding that private counsel's notes of interview with White House 
counsel, as a private client, were privileged as against the same Independent Counsel's grand jury 
subpoenas even beyond the client's death). 
41. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
42. United States v. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944); Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. 
Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (granting coram nobis to petitioner, reciting circumstances of 
Department of Justice failures to make court aware of true state of facts and internal DOJ opinions 
expressed). For a brief story of the Korematsu and Hirabayashi cases and a collection of relevant 
document excerpts, see NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAw 229-241 (2d ed. 1996). 
43. PETER H. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 195-218, 287-302 (1983). McCloy continued to believe that 
his conduct was justified by his view of the need for the internment. See id. at 348, 351-54. He has won 
praise from other important commentators. ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS 
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 11 (1993 ). 
44. See, e.g., Harold Leventhal, What the Court Expects of the Federal Lawyer, 27 FED. BAR J. 1 
(1967). 
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War Department lawyers found themselves in a pressurized situation. General 
DeWitt's report on the military need for evacuation of Japanese-Americans was 
unacceptable to Assistant Secretary of War McCloy for critical reasons-DeWitt 
steadfastly refused to authorize changes.45 Ten copies of the report had been 
printed and bound.46 Intermediaries worked out amended language to solve the 
dispute between DeWitt and McCloyY The Justice Department, through an 
Edward Ennis request,48 already had asked to see any "published material" on the 
evacuation.49 War Department lawyers did not want the Justice Department to see 
the bound, flawed report. They eliminated their problem by destroying the ten 
copies of the original offending report along with the "galley proofs, galley pages, 
drafts and memorandums [of it]."50 The resulting brief filed by the Department of 
Justice in the Hirabayashi case reflected only discussions of the report but not the 
actual report, and it included claims and factual assertions that were flatly 
contradicted in the now-destroyed report.51 Even lacking the report, some material 
contradictions between the War Department position and the government's briefs 
were clear. Ennis lost his effort to persuade Solicitor General Fahy to reveal that 
intelligence agency advice to the War Department (actually to General DeWitt) was 
directly contrary to the statements regarding the issue relied on in the government 
brief. 52 
These government lawyers owed no duty of confidentiality to their client to 
protect the War Department's frauds from disclosure to the Court. No legitimate 
picture of the desires of their client dictated that their client would demand such 
confidentiality, nor could it legitimately do so. Irons wrote, "As a loyal 
government lawyer, Ennis swallowed his doubts and added his name to the 
Hirabayashi brief .... "53 In reality, Ennis swallowed his inclination to reveal fraud 
by the government. In fairness to Ennis, he never learned of the destruction of the 
original report and did not receive the substituted report until long after the 
Hirabayashi opinion had been rendered.54 Frauds by War Department lawyers had 
kept Justice lawyers ignorant of many of the most critical contradictions between 
War Department positions and the positions taken in the government's briefs to the 
Court. By the time the Korematsu brief was being drafted, the substituted War 
Department Report had been published the first publication of the Report as far as 
Ennis and other Justice lawyers knew.55 The Report claimed that Japanese 
Americans had engaged in espionage activities after Pearl Harbor, maintaining 
radio contact to Japanese submarines and passing information that led to the 
sinking of American ships. At Justice lawyers' request, the FBI and FCC reported 
45. IRONS, supra note 43, at 209. 
46. /d. at 207. 
47. /d. at 210. 
48. Ennis was Director of the Department of Justice's Alien Enemy Control Unit. /d. at 23. 
49. /d. at 206. 
50. /d.at210-1l. 
51. /d. at 211-12. 
52. /d. at 204. 
53. /d. at 207. 
54. /d. at 207. 
55. /d. at 278. 
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back regarding these War Department claims, flatly refuting them.56 Further, the 
FCC chairman assured the Justice lawyers that General DeWitt and his staff had 
been made aware of the FCC's and FBI's intensive investigation that had 
determined that these radio reports were falseY Nonetheless, the War Department 
report, on which Justice's Supreme Court brief would rely, made the false radio 
report claims. 
In the first draft of the Justice brief in Korematsu, a footnote was inserted that 
clearly communicated to the Court the factual conflicts with the War Department 
Report, particularly on the Japanese American espionage claims.58 First, Solicitor 
General Fahy toned down the footnote, removing language that would alert the 
Court to the sources of the conflicting facts: the FCC and FBI investigations and 
their reports.59 The conflict then shifted to Ennis and McCloy, who found 
themselves opposed yet again.60 McCloy demanded first of Ennis, then of Fahy, 
that the footnote be removed entirely.61 Ennis and the briefs initial drafter, John L. 
Burling, argued to Assistant Attorney General Wechsler that their ethical 
obligations required they not rely on a War Department Report that they knew to be 
based on key falsehoods.62 As the negotiations ensued, they threatened to refuse to 
sign the brief if the footnote was deleted.63 Armed with a more complete version of 
the conflict, brought to his attention by Wechsler, Fahy decided to argue for 
Burling's original footnote.64 After a meeting attended by Fahy, Wechsler and War 
Department lawyer, Captain Fisher, the footnote debate changed.65 When finally 
submitted to the court, the footnote gave no notice of contrary views at the Justice 
Department, contrary facts to those in the Report, or the FCC and FBI reports.66 
The names of Ennis and Burling both appeared on the briefs signature page. 67 
A loyal government lawyer should swallow doubts about differences in legal 
and policy arguments, but not about government frauds regarding critical, 
!d. 
56. ld. at 280-82. 
57. !d. at 284-85. 
58. !d. at 286. 
The Final Report of General De Witt is relied on in this brief for statistics and other details 
concerning the actual evacuation and the events that took place subsequent thereto. The 
recital of the circumstances justifying the evacuation as a matter of military necessity, 
however, is in several respects, particularly with reference to the use of illegal radio 
transmitters and shore-to-ship signaling by persons of Japanese ancestry, in conflict with 
information in the possession of the Department of Justice. In view of the contrariety of the 
reports on this matter we do not ask the Court to take judicial notice of the recital of those 
facts contained in the Report. 
59. ld. at 286. 
60. !d. at 287. 
61. ld. at 207-288. 
62. !d. at 288. 
63. ld. at 290. 
64. /d. at 289. 
65. ld. at 281-92. 
66. !d. at 290-91. "We have specifically recited in this brief the facts relating to the justification for 
the evacuation, of which we ask the Court to take judicial notice; and we rely upon the [War 
Department] Final Report only to the extent that it relates to such facts." !d. 
67. !d. at 292. 
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underlying facts. A single, courageous lawyer who would have disclosed the 
government's fraud might have changed the course of the internment. Outside of 
discrete areas of protection, whenever wrongdoing has occurred, a government 
lawyer should reveal information about a client that a private lawyer would protect. 
II. "OTHER LAW" 
The bar ethics rules account for the government lawyer difference regarding 
the duty of confidentiality. The D.C. Bar, with its great experience dealing with 
government lawyer issues, provides an exception to the duty of confidentiality that 
expresses this difference in roles between government and private lawyers. Its bar 
rules allow revelation by government lawyers whenever the law permits revelation. 
In general, lawyers are permitted to reveal client confidences when required 
by other law.68 Government lawyers in the District of Columbia are permitted to 
reveal client confidences when permitted by other law. 69 Other jurisdictions should 
consider following the District's lead on this issue, with which the District 
obviously has substantial experience and expertise. 
A. 28 u.s.c. § 535(b) 
As discussed in section I, 28 U.S.C. section 535(b) demands that federal 
employees, including lawyers, report criminal misconduct of other federal 
employees. This obligation to report and reveal information represents "other law" 
that requires disclosures of otherwise confidential government-client information.7° 
B. The Federal Whistle Blower Statute 
The Whistle Blower Protection Act1 1 occupies a middle status between laws 
that require and laws that permit disclosure of otherwise confidential information. 
While it may not require disclosure, the Act does more than merely permit it. The 
statute's very purpose is to encourage disclosure of information regarding 
violations of law, rules, or regulations, and other abuses of authority.72 Whistle 
blowers have permission to reveal information within the scope of the statute, but 
they need more than mere permission to make disclosures. The personal and 
professional disadvantages of whistle blowing are substantiaJ.73 Without 
substantial encouragement to disclose, in the form of protection and, when 
appropriate, causes of action, few whistles will be blown. 74 The statute occupies a 
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6) (2003). The rule's permission to reveal what 
is required by law to be revealed is internally misleading. The permission relieves the lawyer of 
disciplinary liability when she does what other law requires. Thus, a lawyer is not merely permitted to 
make such revelations; she is required to do so. 
69. D.C. Bar Rule 1.6(d)(2)(B) (1990). 
70. Lindsey, 153 F.3d at 1274; Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920-21. 
71. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989). 
72. 5 u.s.c. § 2302(b)(8) (1989). 
73. See generally CHARLES PETERS & TAYLOR BRANCH, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: DISSENT IN THE 
PuBLIC INTEREST (1972) (collecting government whistle blower stories). 
74. Deborah L. Rhode, Symposium: The Future of the Legal Profession: Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 
Spring 2005] DUTY TO BREACH CONFIDENTIALITY 643 
legislative place analogous to a common law tort claim for wrongful discharge in 
private employment, the purpose of which is to encourage disclosures that advance 
certain important public policies. 75 Conduct protected by a whistle blower statute 
should not produce lawyer discipline. When such conduct is engaged in by a 
government lawyer exposing government misconduct, bar discipline is a highly 
inappropriate, unproductive response. 76 
The Whistle Blower Protection Act encourages federal employees to "serve 
the public interest by assisting in the elimination of fraud [and other enumerated 
wrongs] ... "77 The encouragement comes in t~e form of protection from retaliation 
for disclosures that the employee reasonably believes will expose the fraud or 
violation of law.78 More than mere permission to disclose certain facts, the Act 
serves the interests of the United States (the government lawyer's client) by 
empowering those most likely to know of such frauds to reveal and remedy them. 
The Act affords its protection to applicants, employees, and former 
employees.79 Nothing less would serve the statutory purpose. Applicants might 
learn of government frauds and be deprived job opportunities because of 
disclosure. As a former employer of a covered employee, the government retains 
significant power to punish harmful or embarrassing revelations by alumni whistle 
blowers. Former employees have substantial, continuing exposure to retaliatory 
conduct by the government: negative references; government threats of disclosures 
to current employers; criminal charges; and even bar discipline complaints. 
The Act does not afford protection for disclosures merely within the chain of 
command.80 Disclosures to anyone else ("including, for example, a reporter, a 
congressional staffer, or an interest group representative")81 are protected and 
therefore encouraged. 82 
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 665,702-03 (1994). 
75. See, e.g., Liberatore v. Melville Corporation, 168 F.3d 1326, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding 
pharmacist stated a wrongful discharge claim where he was fired because he intended to report 
violations to the FDA); Fingerhut v. Children's National Medical Center, 738 A.2d 799, 806-07 (D.C. 
1999) (finding a valid wrongful discharge claim where director of hospital security was fired for 
reporting bribe to FBI officials and cooperating in subsequent investigation). See also Balla v. Gambro, 
584 N.E.2d 104, 108 (lll. 1991) (rejecting common law retaliatory discharge action in favor of in-house 
corporate lawyer because ethical requirements to make the same disclosure obviated need for tort action 
encouragement to report). 
76. The statute supplies its own protection from retaliation for protected revelations. That 
protection likely extends to prohibit the employer from making a bar ethics complaint, but that issue, the 
statute's explicit protection, is largely outside the scope of this article. For the issues discussed in this 
article, the statute occupies the place of other law that permits disclosure of client confidences. 
77. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12 § 2(a)(l) (1989) (codified at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 1201 (1989)) ('The Congress finds that-(1) Federal employees who make disclosures described in 
section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, serve the public interest .... "). 
78. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (1989). 
79. 5 u.s.c. § 1221 (1989). 
80. See Huffman v. Office of Personnel Management, 263 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(finding that disclosures to a supervisor are not protected but disclosures to press are protected). 
81. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower, supra note 1, at 308. 
82. See Horton v. Dep't of the Navy, 66 F.3d 279, 282 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that disclosures to 
the press are protected disclosures); H.R. Rep. No. 100-413 at 12-13 (1988) (listing the media as an 
independent entity, such as Congress, to which disclosures may be made). 
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The Act itself would not protect a government lawyer from a bar association 
imposition of discipline.83 The bar association is not the government employer; the 
Act does not explicitly restrict the bar. Nonetheless, some have asserted that bar 
discipline is prohibited by inference from the Act.84 The Act's coverage prohibits 
the government employer from taking the retaliatory action of filing a bar 
complaint. The Act's real protection against bar discipline comes from its status as 
other law that permits disclosure, taking the material revealed outside the 
protection of the duty of confidentiality. 85 
III. CLIENT WAIVER 
Considered another way, the government lawyer's client has consented to the 
revelation of certain kinds of otherwise confidential information. The government-
client, by enacting statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) and the Whistle Blower 
Protection Act, has instructed its lawyers to behave in a way that allows, 
encourages, and sometimes requires categories of information to be revealed. No 
agency head, let alone a lesser government official, has the power to speak for the 
government-client in a way that controverts what the laws enacted by that client 
have said in more forceful, public, and binding ways. 
These statutory provisions amount to more than an "other law" exception to 
confidentiality. For the federal government lawyer, they represent the best 
statements of what the client wants the lawyer to do with the client's confidences. 
Private clients may, of course, give informed consent to disclosures of 
confidences. 86 Federal government lawyers ought to look to their superiors and to 
government policy for guidance regarding consent to disclosure of confidences. 
But those murky indicators cannot trump the clear, positive law statement of the 
legislature, signed by the President in the form of statutory pronouncements. 
Statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) and the Whistle Blower Protection Act are 
express waivers of confidentiality with respect to the information covered by the 
statutes by the government lawyer's client, whatever might be the preference of 
current policymakers and superiors. 
83. Project on Government Oversight (POGP); Government Accountability Project (GAP); Public 
Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER); The Art of Anonymous Activism: Serving the 
Public While Surviving Public Service 58 (Nov. 2002). Other government Whistle blowers have been 
subjected to bar complaints based on their conduct. Cindy Ossias, who disclosed frauds in the 
California Department of Insurance was the subject of a bar complaint. The bar committee concluded 
that she had not engaged in disciplinable conduct. Nancy McCarthy, Rule Change Proposed to Protect 
Government Whistle Blowers, CAL. ST. B.J., March 2002, at 1; Editorial, A Gadfly Wins at Last, WASH. 
POST, Aug 16, 2000. 
84. Cramton, supra note 1, at 320 ("Although the whistle blower protections deal expressly only 
with retaliatory actions of the employing agency, the application of professional discipline by a state 
disciplinary board is likely to be precluded."). 
85. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(6) (2003); D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 
l.6(d)(2)(B) (2002). 
86. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(a) (2003); D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 
l.6(d)(2)(B) (2002). 
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IV. "NOISY WITHDRAWAL" AND THE NEW SCOPE OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
In general, the balance between revealing a client's frauds and protecting 
legitimate confidences is moving toward disclosure and away from protection of 
confidentiality. Even with private sector clients, the August 2003 amendment to 
Model Rule 1.6 has moved the balance away from confidentiality and toward 
revelation by inserting exceptions that have been proposed and re-proposed on 
several occasions. 87 While confidentiality is a lawyer's core duty to be protected at 
great cost, ultimately confidences are either legitimate or illegitimate. In effect, the 
rules identify which nuggets of client information are illegitimate confidences and 
permits or requires their revelation. Without question, the balance's movement has 
been in reaction to public frauds that lawyers have claimed an inability to rectify 
because of their confidentiality duty. 88 
The federal government lawyer's client has an even less legitimate expectation 
that its lawyers will remain silent when it uses their work in a fraud. An example 
of such an instance occurred in 2002, following the capture of John Walker Lindh. 
John Walker Lindh had been captured on November 21, 2001, in Afghanistan.89 
On December 7, John DePue, a Terrorism and Violent Crime Section Department 
of Justice (DOJ) lawyer asked Jesselyn Radack what the law of professional 
responsibility said about whether Lindh could be directly interviewed in a 
custodial, overt way: specifically, whether he should be made aware that his father 
had retained counsel to represent him.90 A 1995 Yale Law graduate, Radack had 
spent the six-plus years since graduation in government, an Attorney General's 
Honors Program lawyer, representing the United States first at DOJ's Civil 
Division, and then in the Professional Responsibility Advisory Office (PRA0).91 
In this capacity, Radack gave advice to inquiring DOJ lawyers about a wide range 
87. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2), (3) (2003); The Legislative History of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, at 47-51 (Center for Professional Responsibility ABA 1987); 
Margaret Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 
2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETIDCS 1, 11-12 (2002). 
88. E.g. Watergate; the S&L debacle. Dan Ackman, It's the Lawyers' Tum to Answer for Enron, 
FORBES, Mar. 14, 2002 ("[A]s lawyers they have no obligations to blow the whistle on client 
wrongdoing. Indeed, they have the opposite obligation to maintain client secrets." (quoting a Vinson & 
Elkins partner)). 
89. United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 569 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
90. Examining the E-mail, MSNBC NEWS, June 15, 2002, at 1, available at 
www.MSNBC.msn.com/id/3067190; Motion to Inspect and Copy, United States v. Lindh, case no. 02-
37-A, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565 (2002), filed December 31, 2003, Exhibit 15, Jesselyn Radack affidavit. The 
lawyer to whom Mr. DePue referred, James Brosnahan, eventually did meet with Lindh more than a 
month later, on January 24, 2002. Brosnahan, among other things having served with the Special 
Prosecutor for the Iran/Contra matters investigating the first President Bush's pardon of Caspar 
Weinberger, represented Lindh as lead counsel in negotiating his later plea agreement. Brosnahan 
complained fervently about his many faxes to the Justice Department asserting his representation of 
Lindh during December 2001. Byron York, American Tali-lawyer: Defending John Walker Lindh, THE 
NATIONAL REVIEW, February 25, 2002; Washington File, John Walker Lindh Was Denied Legal 
Representation, Defense Says, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Jan. 24, 2002, 
http://usinfo.state.gov/topicallpollterror/02012417.htm. 
91. Motion to Inspect and Copy, supra note 90. 
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of ethics issues. She was good at her work.92 She had never herself been the 
subject of a bar discipline complaint. According to DOJ, she was good at her work 
until that day.93 
She gave her opinion in a series of at least fourteen exchanged emails with Mr. 
DePue. In part, she said, "I consulted with a Senior Legal Advisor here at PRAO 
and we don't think you can have the FBI agent question Walker. It would be a pre-
indictment, custodial overt interview, which is not authorized by law."94 She was 
asked for the type of advice that was regularly given to DOJ lawyers once she left 
for PRAO. She gave it. It seems not to have been the advice her client, the United 
States of America, wanted to hear. Her advice was not taken. Instead, her client, 
through FBI agents on the ground in Afghanistan, decided to question Lindh 
without informing him that his family had retained counsel to represent him.95 
Radack' s advice was reflected in a series of at least a dozen emails. When the 
Lindh court ordered the production of internal DOJ communications regarding 
Lindh's right to counsel, Radack discovered that the hard copies of her emails had 
been purged from the file. She had placed the hard copies in the file. They were 
gone. Only three of them had been delivered to Assistant United States Attorney 
Bellows for submission to the court. 
Initially, the government's response to the court's order was resultantly 
incomplete. Radack's advice regarding Lindh's right to counsel had been ignored. 
Radack was simultaneously threatened with a sudden change in job performance 
evaluation by her superiors. She had good reason to believe that DOJ would not 
reveal her advice to the court and that the DOJ' s submission of some but not all of 
her emails was a fraud on the court. A fraud on a court accomplished by misusing 
the lawyer's services requires the lawyer to undertake "reasonable remedial 
measures," including revelation of the fraud.96 Under principles of noisy 
withdrawal, even as a private lawyer and even had the fraud not been perpetrated 
on a court, she would have been entitled to withdraw and give notice identifying 
the fraudulent submissions from which she was disassociating herself. While the 
notion of a noisy withdrawal does not explicitly permit revelation of client 
confidences, commentators recognize that the permitted notice effectively reveals 
confidences and operates as a hidden exception to the confidentiality rule. 97 The 
most recent amendments to Model Rule 1.6 explicitly allow this type of disclosure 
without the need of a noisy withdrawal subterfuge. 
The August 2003 amendment to ABA Model Rule 1.6 and even former 
notions of noisy withdrawal both suggest that even if she had been private counsel, 
Ms. Radack's conduct was permissible, if not required. Under Model Rule 1.6, 
when a client, even a private client, misuses the lawyer's work as part of a fraud, a 
92. /d. at 'll'll5, 6, and 8. 
93. /d. 
94. Examining the Email, supra note 90, at l. 
95. /d. at 3. 
96. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCf R. 3.3(a)(3) (2002). 
97. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a Professional Norm, 
33 EMORY L.J. 271, 306 (1984) ("[S]ome fools may not understand that Rule 1.6 does not mean what it 
seems to mean."); Monroe Freedman, Ethical Ends and Ethical Means, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 55, 61 
(1991). 
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lawyer may reveal the client's confidences to rectify the fraud or wrongdoing.98 
Further general erosion of the duty of confidentiality is indicated by new 
obligations to report on client misconduct, such as Sarbanes-Oxley,99 which have 
joined old obligations to report, such as 28 section 535(b), permitting and in some 
instances requiring lawyers to reveal what would otherwise be confidential client 
information. On the pages of the D.C. Bar's official magazine, addressing D.C. 
lawyers' concerns that reporting under Sarbanes-Oxley could subject them to 
discipline for revealing confidences, SEC Chairman Harvey Goldschmid offered 
reassurance: 
"Federal law is supreme. Any lawyer in D.C. who finds material, ongoing 
financial fraud, reports it up, and sees that the wrongful conduct has not 
stopped, is in a position to go outside, pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley section 
307 and the SECs rulemaking. No one may discipline that lawyer for 
properly reporting out." 
Hirschhorn [chair of the D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee] affirms 
Goldschmid, adding reassuringly, "One of the exceptions to keeping client 
confidences in the D.C. rules is where it's required by law or court order. So 
if there's a federal law, such as Sarbanes-Oxley, that says you must make 
disclosures, my guess, without having litigated it, is that the federal law 
trumps a D.C. law that prohibits disclosure."100 
Regardless of the supremacy clause, Sarbanes-Oxley and other laws requmng 
disclosure, or for government lawyers, permitting disclosure, fit the other law 
exception to the duty of confidentiality. 
The crime-fraud exception to the privilege provides yet another useful 
analogy: consider cases like United States v. Jacobs. 101 In Jacobs, a lawyer's 
advice was unheeded, and further, the client told third parties that the lawyer had 
approved of the transaction the client was proposing. 102 Here, Radack gave advice 
to her client; the advice was unheeded; the client was later asked about advice it 
had been given; and the client responded that it had not been advised in the manner 
Radack had advised. This sort of fraudulent use of a lawyer's advice both waives 
the privilege and permits the lawyer to rectify the fraud. To be sure, the Jacobs 
defendant had formed an intent to misuse his lawyer's advice before asking for it. 
That fact removed the communication from the privilege based on the crime-fraud 
exception in the first instance. But even without the planned misuse fact in Jacobs, 
Jacobs's lawyer would have been permitted to reveal Jacobs's confidences upon 
learning that Jacobs was misusing the lawyer's advice. 
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (2002); Hazard, supra note 97, at 306. 
99. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
100. Robert Pack, Dilemmas in Attorney Client Confidentiality, WASHINGTON LAWYER, Jan. 2004. 
101. 117 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1997). 
102. ld. 
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CONCLUSION 
Whether analyzed as a matter of general principles of the lawyer-client 
relationship or as a matter of ethics rule application, federal government lawyers 
occupy a unique position. Confidentiality is not a lawyer responsibility that is 
unaffected by the identity of his or her client. By its nature as a public-abiding 
entity, the federal government commands reduced expectations of its lawyers' 
confidential maintenance of information. The ethics rules of the District of 
Columbia recognize as much. Statutes represent both "other law" exceptions to the 
duty of confidentiality and unequivocal, binding statements of client consent to the 
revelation of certain classes of information. Their encouragement of and in some 
instances command of information disclosure represent more than mere permission 
to reveal the information. They represent the federal government lawyer's duty to 
reveal information, or conceived of in a different way, the federal government 
lawyer's duty to breach confidentiality. 
